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Abstract In this paper I analyze optimal monetary and fiscal policy in a monetary
union from a union-wide perspective. For this purpose I lay out a New Keynesian business
cycle model of a currency union with rigid real wages. The fiscal policy is implemented at
the country level through the choice of government spending, while the monetary authority
sets a common nominal interest rate. I find that, given these assumptions, in the presence
of country-specific as well as in the presence of symmetric shocks to technology there is
a country-level trade-off between stabilizing inflation and output relative to its efficient
outcome. After a union-wide technology shock also the common monetary authority faces
a trade-off. Hence, if the shift to technology is common to all member countries the
optimal policy on a union-wide level requires that the common monetary policy reacts
slightly countercyclical. This is reversed on the domestic level, where, under the optimal
policy, the government purchases stabilize the economy via countercyclical spending, no
matter if shocks are symmetric or not. Although not always optimal, I find that strict
inflation targeting is very close to the optimal policy in terms of aggregate welfare losses.
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1 Introduction
Due to the current economic downturn the public (and academic) debate about monetary
policy in the Euro area has flared up again. Although under somewhat political pressure,
the European Central Bank (ECB) adheres on its principle of price level stabilization.
Compared to their US counterpart, the Federal Reserve System (Fed), the ECB uses mon-
etary policy in order to stabilize the economy only very tentatively. This is in line with
some of the cutting-edge models used for monetary policy advice. Strict price level target-
ing corresponds to the recent emphasis in modeling economies within the New Keynesian
(NK) framework on stabilizing the output gap. In this setting there is no trade-off be-
tween price stability and stability of output around potential. In the last few years this
modeling framework has become very popular as a theoretical basis for policy decisions for
western central banks. This dynamic modeling approach assumes imperfect competition
in the goods market and sluggish nominal price adjustment. Inspired by a seminal paper
of Clarida, Gal´ı and Gertler (1999), a lot of research effort has put into the advancement
of these NK theories.
The formation of a monetary union in Europe and the debate about the “Stability and
Growth Pact” (SGP) make the analysis of fiscal and monetary interactions an especially
interesting topic. It is often argued that the loss of monetary policy flexibility due to
the merger of currencies increases the potential role of fiscal policy as a stabilization tool
and the need for fiscal policy cooperation within Europe. Thus, to optimally characterize
policy in the European Monetary Union (EMU) the fiscal stance has to be taken into
account. The interaction of monetary and fiscal policy in a NK modeling framework has
been examined for instance by Corsetti and Pesenti (2001) and Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe
(2004) (for a closed economy) or by Lombardo and Sutherland (2004) and Leith and
Wren-Lewis (2008) (for an open economy).
Given its potential relevance for political decision makers, only a few papers con-
sidering monetary and fiscal aspects in a currency union have been written in the last
years. Most of the existing literature analyzes monetary and fiscal policy within a
micro-founded, two-country sticky-price model of a monetary union (e.g. Beetsma and
Jensen, 2005 or Ferrero, 2007 and 2009). Since a two-country approach may be usefull to
discuss issues concerning the interaction between two large economies (e.g. the EU and
the US), it can only hardly be viewed as a realistic description of a monetary union like
the EMU with currently sixteen member states. Just recently, Gal´ı and Monacelli (2008)
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proposed a framework which incorporates the features above mentioned, but comprises
many open economies linked by trade and financial flows. Since most of the member
states of the EMU are small relative to the union as a whole, domestic policy decisions
have very little impact on other member states.
After having been largely ignored by monetary economists for a long time, the im-
portance of real rigidities for monetary policy has received fresh impetus with a recent
paper by Blanchard and Gal´ı (2007). They showed that including rigid real wages in a
NK business cycle model leads to a notable trade-off between stabilizing the price level
and the welfare relevant output. Moreover, as already highlighted in Gal´ı, Gertler and
Lopez-Salido (2001), by constituting a channel from wage to inflation dynamics through
firms’ marginal costs, slow adjustment in wages will translate into more persistent
movements in inflation, which is particularly found in European data.
Real wage rigidity, indeed, seems to be an important feature of European labor
markets. As found by Apaia and Pichelmann (2007), using micro data from all EMU
countries, the half-lives of deviations of the real wages from its equilibrium level are
varying between three quarters and three years.
Hence, in the analysis of European-wide monetary and fiscal policy design, real
wage rigidity can hardly be neglected. Despite its importance, research in this direction
its still in its infancy. Campolmi and Faia (2006) and Arbritti (2007) were the first (and
as far as I know still the only) authors including real wage rigidity in a dynamic model of
a currency union.
Thus, in my opinion, an analytical framework of the EMU should have the following
four properties: It has to rely on the assumptions of standard NK theory (i.e. imperfect
competition and nominal rigidities), should include a monetary and fiscal authority, has
to comprise many open economies (not only two), and has to incorporate real rigidities.
The model I propose in this paper meets all desiderata listed above. More precisely,
I use a version of the Gal´ı and Monacelli (2008) model extended by a partial adjustment
process of the real wage. I focus on optimal monetary and fiscal policy from a union-
wide perspective. That is, optimal monetary and fiscal policy are derived by maximizing
an aggregated (second-order) welfare approximation. More precisely, I assume that both
fiscal and monetary authorities implement Ramsey solutions (i.e. an optimal commitment
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strategy).
The main findings of the analysis are as follows. Since I assume that a single member
country has very little impact on union-wide economic conditions, an idiosyncratic shock
does not affect union-wide economic dynamics. Hence, the common central bank has
no need to intervene. However, if each member country is affected by a shock (or they
are not idiosyncratic), the common central bank faces a trade-off between stabilizing the
price level and the welfare relevant output. Because of the complexity of the tarheting
rule, an optimal policy is hard to implement, when possible at all. However, I find that
strict inflation targeting is close to the optimal policy (in terms of welfare losses), and
thus can be seen as a “second best” option which is easy to implement by the common
central bank. The optimal union-wide monetary policy, however, is conditional on the
fiscal policies implemented optimally by domestic fiscal authorities. Additionally to the
findings of Gal´ı and Monacelli (2008), I find that optimal domestic fiscal policy plays
a national stabilization role also if shocks are symmetric. The quantitative simulations
show that the strength of countercyclical public spending increases with the importance
of nominal and real rigidities. Since optimal domestic fiscal policy has an important
stabilization role - also from a union-wide perspective - external constraints like the SGP
should be questioned, or at least reconsidered.
Moreover, I find that real wage rigidity indeed provides a rational for a more inertial
inflation dynamics. The New Keynesian Phillips Curve derived here has a noticable
similarity to a “hybrid” version recently used in the literature for empirical investigation
on inflation dynamics.
The remainder of this paper is as follows: Section two describes related literature.
The underlying model is outlined in section three. Next, I examine an important
benchmark of the model: the pareto efficient allocation. Then a short overview of the
implementation method is given and the baseline calibration of the model is presented.
The results of the analysis are reported in section six. Section seven concludes.
2 Related Literature
An extensive amount of work has been done on monetary policy in micro-founded mod-
els with sticky prices. Also the interaction between monetary and fiscal policy in such
a framework has been analyzed in recent years (e.g. Schmidt-Grohe and Uribe, 2004 or
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Leith and Wren-Lewis, 2008). Although it has become acutely important with the cre-
ation of the EMU, multi-country versions of these models have attained less attention.
Benigno (2004) analyzed optimal monetary policy in a two-country framework. Neglect-
ing the role of fiscal policy, he showed that in the presence of idiosyncratic shocks to
technology, stabilizing the price level is desirable from a welfare perspective. In a similar
setting but including national fiscal authorities, Beetsma and Jensen (2005) furthermore
found evidence that countercyclical spending on national level is welfare-enhancing from
a union-wide perspective. As aformentioned, Gal´ı and Monacelli (2008) also studied op-
timal monetary policy and the role of fiscal stabilization. In a multi-country framework
they derived, however, quite similar implications how monetary and fiscal policy should
be implemented. Based on the Gal´ı and Monacelli (2008) model, Forlati (2008) analyzed
fiscal policy under no-coordination. She found that the normative prescriptions empha-
sized by the authors abovementioned, are not valid any more once policymakers are not
coordinated. In this case, optimal monetary policy does not imply that the central bank
stabilize the average union inflation, because it has to take into account the distortions
caused by the lack of coordination among fiscal policymakers. Ferrero (2007,2009) addi-
tionally examined the role of distortionary taxation in a two-country framework, again
from a union-wide perspective. In his setting, monetary policy should achieve aggregate
price level stability, while fiscal policy should stabilize country-specific shocks via perma-
nent variations of government spending and tax gaps but abstain from creating inflationary
expectations at the union level.
A first step in introducing real rigidities in a two-country model of a currency
union is done by Campolmi and Faia (2006). In contrast to this paper, however, they
focussed on the investigation of the impact of labor market imperfections on inflation
differentials between members, rather than on optimal policies. Closer to the framework
used in this paper, is the modeling approach in Abritti (2007). However, he considered a
world consisting of only two countries and additionally assumes market rigidities, which
generate involuntary unemployment. In contrast to this paper, he introduced real wage
rigidity that follows a stochastic process. Furthermore, both - Campolmi and Faia (2006)
and Abritti (2007) - did not include a fiscal sector in their analysis. A welfare analysis or
a derivation of optimal policies neither is part of their analyses.
Next to the literature on sticky price models of a currency union, papers using
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real wage rigidities in NK models should be briefly reviewed. Just recently Blanchard
and Gal´ı (2007) reconsidered the impact of rigid real wages on monetary policy design in
a closed economy. Within a basic NK model, they showed that the presence of inertial
adjustment of real wages leads to a notable trade-off in monetary policy design. They
found that under this additional assumption, there is a trade-off between stabilizing
inflation and the welfare relevant output. Moreover, they found that taking into account
rigid real wages is a crucial element in understanding persistent inflation.
Next to sticky inflation dynamics, real wage rigidity can also help to explain observed
labor market fluctuations. As shown by Hall (2005) and Shimer (2005) real wage rigidity
is necessary to explain the large cyclical variation in job vacancies1.
Inspired by these papers, some richer sticky price models with rigid real wages - ad-
ditionally considering labor market frictions - have been developed (e.g. Christoffel and
Linzert, 2006 or Faia, 2008).
Especially in European countries, inertial real wage adjustment seems to be an im-
portant feature to properly understand labor market dynamics. It is often argued that
European labor markets are rigid in many perspectives. High firing costs and unemploy-
ment benefits and in particular collective wage bargaining prevent wages from adjusting
instantaneously. There is a lot of micro-founded theory for possible reasons intensifying
this rigidity. Among others, one could mention efficient wage contracts, loss aversion,
strong union power, or fairnes considerations2. Empirical evidence for rigid real wages has
been given by a number of studies in recent years3. They all attest relatively high real
wage rigidity in the EU (compared to the US).
3 The Model
The model I use to derive the optimal monetary and fiscal policy in a currency union draws
on the standard New Keynesian (NK) modeling approach as proposed in Gal´ı (2008) and
Gal´ı and Monacelli (2005). This dynamic stochastic NK framework mainly differs from a
standard Real Business Cycle (RBC) theory by the assumption of imperfect competition
and nominal price rigidity. Gal´ı and Monacelli (2008) extent the standard NK approach,
1However, the effects of real wage rigidity are still matter of some controversy. See for instance
Mortensen and Nagypa´l (2007) for a critical review.
2For instance, Bewley (1999) provides an overview of recent research in this direction
3see e.g. , Bauer et al. (2004), Barwell and Schweitzer (2007), Deviciente et al. (2007), Dickens at al.
(2007), Du Caju et al. (2007), Heckel et al. (2008), Holden and Wulfsberg (2007).
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which only considers one single economy, to a union of countries sharing the same currency.
I expand the Gal´ı and Monacelli model of a currency union by assuming real wage rigidities.
The world consists of a continuum of small open economies indexed by i ∈ (0, 1). Each
economy is of measure zero, from this it follows that a domestic policy decision has no
impact on the rest of the union. I assume that all countries share identical preferences,
technologies, and market structures but different real wage rigidities.
3.1 People
Consider a typical country belonging to the union, say country i. The representative
infinitely-lived household maximizes
E0
∞∑
i=0
βt U(Cit , N
i
t , G
i
t), (1)
where
U(Cit , N
i
t , G
i
t) ≡ (1− χ) logCit + χ logGit −
(N it )
1+φ
1 + φ
,
with χ ∈ (0, 1) as a weight attached to public consumption. That is, preferences are
defined over the consumption of private and public goods, Cit and G
i
t, and labor N
i
t , which
is assumed to be immobile across countries4. The composite of private consumption is
defined by:
Cit ≡
(Cii,t)
1−α(CiF,t)
α
(1− α)(1−α)αα (2)
where Cii,t represents the household’s consumption of domestic goods. Formally spoken,
Cii,t is a CES aggregation of all goods produced in country i itself, given by
Cii,t ≡
 1∫
0
Cii,t(j)
−1
 dj


−1
,
where j ∈ (0, 1) denotes the type of good. As described below, I assume that each country
produces a continuum of differentiated goods indexed by j, where each good is produced
by a seperate firm. Moreover, there is no good produced in more than one country.
Nevertheless, people in country i consume goods produced in foreign countries. That
is, again a CES aggregation of the goods produced in all other member states indexed by
4One also could have introduced real money balances as an argument. However, if it enters additively
(as empirical evidence suggests, see Ireland (2004) for the case of the U.S. and Andre´s et al. (2006) for the
case of EMU), money market equilibrium plays no role for the dynamics when the nominal interest rate is
the monetary policy instrument. Therefore, money is ignored in the remainder.
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f ∈ (0, 1), namely:
CiF,t ≡
∫ 1
0
(∫ 1
0
Cif,t(j)
−1
 dj
) 
−1
df.
The home bias in private consumption is denoted as 1 − α. Alternatively, α can be
understood as “index of openness” in country i. Finally, the elasticity of substitution
between varieties produced within any country is represented by  > 1.
As usual, maximization of (1) is subject to a sequence of flow budget constraints given
by∫ 1
0
P it (j)C
i
i,t(j)dj +
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
P ft (j)C
i
f,t(j)djdf + Et{Qt,t+1Bit+1} ≤ Bit +W itN it − T it (3)
for all t = 0, 1, 2, ... P ft (j) is the price of good j produced in country f in units of the
common currency, W it denotes the nominal wage, B
i
t+1 represents the quantity of one-
period, nominally riskless discount bonds purchased in period t = 0, 1, 2, ... and maturing
in period t + 1. Each bond pays one unit of the common currency and its price is Qt,
common across countries. T it is a lump-sum component of income, which may include,
among other items, lump-sum taxes, dividends from ownership of (domestic) firms, etc.
In addition to (3), it is assumed that the representative household in each member
country is subject to a solvency constraint that prevents it to rule out Ponzi-schemes:
lim
T→∞
Et{BfT } ≥ 0 (4)
for all f ∈ (0, 1).
The representative household in country i seeks to optimally allocate a given level of
expenditure across the various goods available. That is, it adjusts the share of a particular
good in its consumption bundle to exploit any relative price differences, i.e. the cost of
consumption is minimized. Optimizing expenditure for any individual good implies the
demand functions of domestic and foreign goods, respectively:
Cii,t(j) =
(
P it (j)
P it
)−
(5)
Cif,t(j) =
(
P ft (j)
P ft
)−
, (6)
for all i, f, j ∈ (0, 1). Here, P it ≡
(∫ 1
0 P
i
t (j)
1−dj
) 1
1− represents an index of prices of all
domestically produced goods, for all i ∈ (0, 1). Since there are no trading frictions, the
law of one price is assumed to hold in all single good markets. This implies, that one
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can equally define P ft ≡
(∫ 1
0 P
f
t (j)
1−dj
) 1
1− as a (producer) price index for the bundle of
goods imported from country f . Reentering these definitions in (5) and (6) and rearranging
terms yields ∫ 1
0
P it (j)C
i
i,t(j)dj = P
i
tC
i
i,t (7)∫ 1
0
P ft (j)C
i
f,t(j)dj = P
f
t C
i
f,t. (8)
Moreover, the optimal allocation of expenditures implies:
P ft C
i
f,t = P
?
t C
i
F,t, (9)
for all f ∈ (0, 1). P ?t ≡ exp
∫ 1
0 p
f
t df denotes the union-wide price index. Note, that
from the perspective of any individual country, P ?t is also the price index of imported
goods. By combining (8) and (9) one can write total expenditures on imported goods as∫ 1
0 P
f
t C
i
f,tdf = P
?
t C
i
F,t.
Next, one can define the consumer price index (CPI) as P ic,t ≡ (P it )1−α(P ?t )α. From
this it follows that one can write the optimal allocation of expenditures between domestic
and imported goods, respectively, in country i can be written as:
P itC
i
i,t = (1− α)P ic,tCit (10)
P ?t C
i
F,t = αP
i
c,tC
i
t . (11)
Now, one can combine the previous results to write the total (optimal) consumption ex-
penditures of the representative household in country i as:
P itC
i
i,t + P
?
t C
i
F,t = P
i
c,tC
i
t . (12)
Finally, one can combine (3) and (12) to express the household’s budget restriction as:
P ic,tC
i
i,t + Et{Qt,t+1Dit+1} ≤ Dit +W itN it + T it . (13)
Maximizing (1) with respect to {Cit}∞t=0, {Git}∞t=0, and {N it}∞t=0 and subject to (13) and
(4), leads to the optimality conditions:
Cit(N
i
t )
φ
1− χ =
W it
P ic,t
(14)
βR?tEt
{(
Cit
Cit+1
)(
P ic,t
P ic,t+1
)}
= 1, (15)
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where R?t =
1
Et{Qt,t+1} denotes the usual gross nominal one-period return. Alternatively,
one can write the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) between consumption and leisure
in (14) and the Euler equation in (15) in log-linearized form (henceforth lower case letters
denote the logs of the respective variables):
wit − pc,t = cit + φnit − log(1− χ)
cit = E{cit+1} − (r?t − Et{piic,t+1} − ρ),
where the CPI inflation is defined as piic,t ≡ pic,t − pic,t−1 and ρ ≡ − log β denotes the time
discount rate.
3.1.1 Some Definitions and Identities
Before proceeding with the analyses, I introduce some definitions and identities that I
will need in the following. First, I determine the effective terms of trade between two
countries, say country i and f . That is, the price of country f ’s domestically produced
goods in terms of country i’s. Thus, formally spoken I define the effective terms of trade
as:
Sif,t ≡
P ft
P it
.
Consequently, I define the effective terms of trade for country i as:
Sit ≡
∫ 1
0 P
i
t di
P it
=
P ?t
P it
= exp
∫ 1
0
(pft − pit)df
= exp
∫ 1
0
sif,t (16)
Alternatively, writing (16) in logs yields sit =
∫ 1
0 sf,tdf . Using the definition of CPI and
(16), one can relate P ic,t and domestic price level P
i
t according to:
P ic,t = P
i
t (Sit)α,
or in logs
pic,t = p
i
t + αs
i
t (17)
Substracting a lagged version of (17) from the same equation one can also relate domestic
inflation, i.e. piit ≡ pit − pit−1, and CPI inflation according to:
piic,t = pi
i
t + α∆s
i
t.
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This makes clear that the gap between CPI inflation and domestic inflation is equal to the
percentage (since expressed in logs) change in terms of trade proportionally to the index
of openness. Obviously, considering the aggregate price level, one has p?c,t = p
?
t and hence
pi?c,t = pi
?
t , since terms of trade vanish of course for the union as a whole. Formally, this
can be seen by intergrating (17) over i and using the fact that
∫ 1
0 s
i
tdi = 0.
3.1.2 International Risk Sharing
I assume that financial markets are complete both at the domestic and at the international
level. Furthermore, each individual’s initial holding of any type of asset is zero. These
assumptions imply perfect consumption risksharing within each country and equalization
of the marginal utilities of consumption between countries:
βR?tEt
{(
Cit
Cit+1
)(
P ic,t
P ic,t+1
)}
= βR?tEt
{(
Cft
Cft+1
)(
P fc,t
P fc,t+1
)}
, (18)
for all i, f ∈ (0, 1). This implies:
Cft
Cit
=
P fc,t
P ic,t
.
Therefore, under complete markets, the MRS between home and other country consump-
tion has to equal the corresponding relative price. Combining (18) and the definitions of
the terms of trade yields:
Cit = υiC
f
t (Sif,t)1−α, (19)
for all i, f ∈ (0, 1) and where υi is a constant generally depending on initial conditions.
As aforementioned, and without loss of generality, I assume symmetric initial conditions
(i.e., zero net foreign asset holdings and an ex-ante identical environment), in which case
one has υi = υ = 1 for all i ∈ (0, 1). Taking logs of (19) yields:
cit = c
?
t + (1− α)sit,
where c?t ≡
∫ 1
0 c
f
t df .
3.1.3 Introducing Real Wage Rigidities
In Europe (and to a some degree in the US) there are no sudden and significant shifts in the
aggregate wage level observed. Moreover, due to collective wage-bargaining agreements,
wages change only infrequently. Hence, a wage that can be freely adjusted in each period
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is hardly consistent with (European) reality. For this reason, many authors have recently
focused on the examination of sluggish wage adjustment.
Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000) and Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005)
introduced nominal wage rigidity into the New Keynesian business cycle model by a Calvo
type wage setting scheme. As in final good price setting, firms are randomly chosen
to change their wages while the remaining firms keep wages unchanged. However, in
Europe, most wages are bargained on a sector wide level, and are not allowed to fluctuate
freely: once settled they remain unchanged for a given period. Moreover, as argued in
Christoffel and Linzert (2005) the Calvo wage rigidity modeling strategy neglects the
crucial interdependence of the wage bargaining process with other labor market issues,
like the flows in and out of employment or the level of unemployment. Furthermore, Hall
(2005) and Shimer (2005) have argued that real (and not nominal) wage rigidity is central
to explaining the cyclical behavior of unemployment and vacancies.
Hall (2005) proposed a modeling strategy of sluggish wage adjustment that improves
the cyclical properties of labor market models. He introduced wage rigidity as a constant
wage rule, which may be interpreted as a wage norm or social consensus. In this paper
I use a version of Hall’s notion of a wage norm in order to introduce real wage rigidity.
In particular, I assume that the real wage W ir,t paid to a worker in country i in period
t = 0, 1, 2, ... is a weighted average of a notional real wage W in,t and a wage norm W , i.e.
W ir,t = (W
i
n,t)
κi(W i)1−κ
i
,
with 0 ≤ κi ≤ 1. Of course, this form of real wage adjustment is unmodeled and ad hoc
5, but it can be thought of as a reduced-form representation of a more intricate search
unemployment setup. A micro foundation of such a setup has been discussed in Bodart
et al. (2006). Concretely, I set W in,t = W
i
r,t−1 and W
i = MRSt. Thus, I assume a partial
adjustment model of the form:
W it
P ic,t
=
(
W it−1
P ic,t−1
)κi
(MRSit)
1−κi ,
or written in logs
wit − pic,t = κi(wit−1 − pic,t−1) + (1− κi)mrsit, (20)
5As shown in Blanchard and Gal´ı (2007) a more complex model with staggered real wage setting would
lead to similar conclusions.
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where κ ∈ [0, 1] for all i ∈ (0, 1) indicates the degree of real persistence in country i6.
This approach is used in several recent papers, e.g. Blanchard and Gal´ı (2007), Christoffel
and Linzert (2005), Faia (2008), Campolmi and Faia (2006), Krause and Lubik (2007)
and Uhlig (2007). Although I do not provide a micro foundation of this approach within
my model, it constitutes a plausible starting point for analyzing the impact of real wage
rigidities on the dynamics of the economy and, hence, on monetary and fiscal policy.
3.2 Policy Authorities
The monetary policy instrument of the common monetary authority is the union-wide
nominal interest rate R?t . (A discussion on how monetary policy should be conducted
is let to section 6.3.) Following Woodford (2003), the model abstracts from monetary
frictions and considers the limit of a “cashless economy”. Hence, seigniorage does not
represent a source of revenues for national governments.
In contrast to the nominal interest rate, fiscal policy is not common across all member
countries. Similarly to private consumption of domestic and imported goods, I define
country i’s household’s public consumption Git. That is, G
i
t is again a CES aggregation of
all public consumption goods available:
Git ≡
(∫ 1
0
Git(j)
−1
 dj
) 
−1
,
where Git(j) denotes the consumption of good j ∈ (0, 1) or equivalently the quantity of
good j purchased by the government. Hence, I assume that the national governments only
purchase goods produced in their own country7. While this is an extreme situation, fiscal
policy remains effective at stabilizing the individual economies in the face of asymmetric
disturbances as long as the public spending indices remain biased towards nationally pro-
duced goods. As will become evident below, government spending will be expansionary
when prices and/or real wages are sticky. As in the case of private consumption one can
derive the government demand schedules for each public good available. Here, I assume
that the government allocates expenditures across individual goods, to minimize total cost.
6Generally, one would want to guarantee that the real wage exceeds the MRS at all times, to prevent
workers from working more than desired, given the wage. For this reason, I consider the real wage in
country i from the household’s perspective, i.e. Wt
P ic,t
and not the real wage in terms of the producer price
index given by
W it
P it
7For instance, Brulhart and Trionfetti (2004) found evidence for (strong) home bias.
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That is, the demand for good j for all j ∈ (0, 1) is given by:
Git(j) =
(
P it (j)
P it
)−
Git
To simplify matters, I assume that public spending is financed either by debt issuance
or lump-sum taxation, so that Ricardian equivalence holds. If one was to abolish the
assumption that the government can levy lump-sum taxes, changes in the amount of
public spending would lead to fluctuations in distortionary taxes, thereby affecting the
supply-side of the economy and potentially diminishing the stimulating effect of an increase
in government spending. Technically, this would cause static steady state distortions8.
However, analyzing the effect of distortionary taxation, is beyond the scope of this paper9.
3.3 Firms
In any individual country, a continuum of firms produces a single good each, indexed
by j ∈ (0, 1). They sell their products in monopolistic competitive goods markets. To
guarantee a pareto efficient steady state of the economy, I assume a constant subsidy
to labor τ i, financed by lump-sum taxes, to undo the distortions caused by imperfect
competition1011. Goods are produced making use of labor. Thus, the production function
for each good j ∈ (0, 1) produced in each country i ∈ (0, 1) has the linear form:
Y it (j) = A
i
tN
i
t (j) (21)
or in logs:
yit(j) = a
i
t + n
i
t(j),
where ait is a coutry specific exogenous stochastic technological factor common to all firms
in the respective country. This productivity shifter is assumed to follow an AR(1) process,
given by:
ait = ρaa
i
t−1 + 
i
t,  ∼WN(0, σ),
8This requires employing the methodology of Benigno and Woodford (2006) to derive an approximated
union-wide welfare objective.
9Ferrero (2007,2009) analyzes the effect of distortionary taxation in a two-country model of a currency
union.
10In the appendix (available upon request) I show, how this subsidy should be set, so that the steady
state of the economy involves an effcient level of output.
11This approach is extensively used in recent literature. For instance, see Rotemberg and Woodford
(1997), Benigno and Benigno (2000), and Woodford (2002) for a discussion in the framework of a micro-
founded model with staggered price-setting and imperfect competition.
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with ρa ∈ (0, 1). Due to the labor subsidy, the firms’ profits per unit of productivity are
P it (j)Y
i
t (j) − (1 − τ i)W
i
t
P it
i
N it (j)/A
i
t for all j ∈ (0, 1). The linear technology implies that
the real marginal costs are independent of the level of production and, hence, are common
across firms. Marginal costs in logs are given by:
mcit = log(1− τ i) + (wit − pit)− ait (22)
12.
Similar to aggregate consumption, I define the aggregate output of i’s economy as
Y it ≡
(∫ 1
0
Y it (j)
−1
 dj
) 
−1
. (23)
Next, I define
Zit ≡
∫ 1
0
Y it (j)
Y it
dj. (24)
Combining (23), (24), and the technology in (21), one can write the amount of labor hired
as
N it =
∫ 1
0
N it (j)dj =
Y it Z
i
t
Ait
(25)
It will be seen below that in equilibrium, i.e. when the economy’s resource constraint
holds, Zit =
∫ 1
0
(
P it (j)
P it
)−
dj. Thus, Zit can be interpreted as an index of the relative price
dispersion across firms.
Note, that given the definitions in (23) and (25), one can state the aggregate relation
between output and employment in logs as:
yit = a
i
t + n
i
t. (26)
A basic assumption of the NK approach are nominal rigidities. Firms are subject to
some constraints on the frequency with which they can adjust their prices of the goods
they sell. A current modeling strategy is to use the formalism proposed in Calvo (1983).
That is, each firm may reset its price only with probability 1 − θ in any given period,
independent of the time elapsed since the last adjustment. Hence, in each period only
a fraction of 1 − θ of all producers reset their prices, while the rest, θ, keep their prices
unchanged. As a consequence, the average duration of a price is given by (1− θ)−1 and θ
12Notice that wit − pit denotes the real wage in terms of the (log) producer price index pit. As above-
mentioned, I differenciate between producer and consumer price indeces, i.e. the (log) real wage from the
consumer’s perspective is given by wit − pic,t.
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can be naturally interpreted as an index of price stickiness. It can be shown that if prices
are set a` la Calvo, maximizing profits yields the optimal price setting strategy:
p¯it = µ+ (1− βθ)
∞∑
k=0
(βθ)kEt{mcit+k + pit+k}, (27)
where p¯it denotes the log of newly set prices in country i and µ ≡ log −1 is the log of the
desired gross mark-up prevailing in a zero inflation steady state13. Hence, firms resetting
their prices will choose a price that corresponds to the desired mark-up over a weighted
average of their current and expected (nominal) marginal costs, with the weight being
proportional to the probability of the price remaining effective at each horizon θk.
3.4 The Dynamic Equilibrium
In this section I summarize conditions determining the dynamic equilibrium of the system.
The following definition characterizes an equilibrium:
DEFINITION 3.1. Given fiscal and monetary policies and exogenous processes, an im-
perfectly competitive equilibrium is a sequence of quantities and prices such that:
1. Households in each country maximize utility subject to their flow budget constraint
and a natural borrowing limit, taking prices as given.
2. Firms in each country maximize profits subject to their technology constraint, taking
as given the demand for their goods.
3. All markets clear.
3.4.1 Demand and Output Determination - The Dynamic IS Equation
In the following I derive an equation characterizing part one of the above definition of a
dynamic equilibrium, namely the demand side of the economy in country i. By definition,
being in equilibrium implies that markets are cleared. Thus, clearing the market for good
j consumed in i requires:
Y it (j) = C
i
i,t(j) +
∫ 1
0
Cfi,t(j)df +G
i
t(j).
13A more detailed discussion of the price setting scheme as well as the role of the mark-up is delivered
in an appendix which is available upon request.
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Using the optimal allocation of expenditures between domestic and imported goods de-
termined by (5), (6), (10), and (11) one can write the latter equation as:
Y it (j) =
(
P it (j)
P it
)− [
(1− α)
(
P ic,t
P it
)
Cit + α
∫ 1
0
(
P fc,f
P it
)
Cft df +G
i
t
]
.
Alternatively, this expression can be combined with the definitions of the terms of trade
in section 3.1.1. to get:
Y it (j) =
(
P it (j)
P it
)− [
(1− α)(Sit)αCit + α(Sit)α
∫ 1
0
(Sif,t)1−αCft df +Git
]
.
Finally, making use of (19), one can write the market clearing condition for good j in
country i as:
Y it (j) =
(
P it (j)
P it
)− [
Cit(Sit)α +Git
]
. (28)
In order to derive an expression for aggregate demand, I combine the latter equation with
the aggregate output in country i defined by (23). This yields:
Y it = C
i
t(Sit)α +Git, (29)
where the term Cit(Sit)α describes the total private consumption in country i. For fur-
ther references, it will be useful to express key equations of the economy’s equilibrium in
terms of (log) deviations from a steady state. Thus, the aggregated goods market clear-
ing condition in (29) approximated around a symmetric zero inflation steady state gives
(Henceforth, a hat denotes the deviation from a steady state of the respective variable.):
yˆit = (1− γ)(cˆit + αsit) + γgˆit, (30)
where γ ≡ GY is the efficient steady state government spending share14, and therefore
(1− γ) denotes the steady state share of private consumption15. Note, that sˆit = sit, since
s¯ = 0. (In the following a bar denotes the steady state value of the respective variable.)
The expression in (30) provides first evidence describing the dynamics in the domes-
tic goods market. Not surprisingly, aggregate output is positively related to domestic
consumption and government spending. Moreover, it is also connected positively to the
effective terms of trade, depending proportionally on the “index of openness”. This fact
can be explained by foreign demand. To see this more clearly, one can derive an expression
14See appendix for a detailed discussion of the efficient steady state of this model.
15A detailed discussion and a proper derivation of an efficient zero-inflation steady state allocation is let
to the appendix.
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for (30) in terms of foreign, i.e. union-wide, demand. By combining the latter equation
with (16) and (19), one can describe the dynamics in the domestic goods market as:
yˆit = γgˆ
i
t + (1− γ)cˆ?t − (1− γ)(pit − p?t ). (31)
Equation (31) establishes that country i’s output is, next to domestic government
spending, positively related to union-wide consumption (which is an index for the strength
of foreign demand), and inversely related to domestic prices (relative to average prices
in the union). By integrating (31) over i, one obtains the union wide market clearing
condition:
yˆ?t = γgˆ
?
t + (1− γ)cˆ?t . (32)
Now, using previous results, one can derive one of the key equations in NK models:
the dynamic IS equation (or DIS, for short).
First, I consider the home economy in country i. Notice that the Euler equation in
(15) can be written in terms of log deviations from the steady state as:
cˆit = Et{cˆit+1} − (r?t − Et{piic,t+1} − ρ).
Combining this expression with (30) yields the domestic DIS equation (approximated
around a symmetric steady state):
yˆit = Et{yˆit+1} − (1− γ)(r?t − Et{piic,t+1} − ρ)− (1− γ)αEt{∆sit+1} − γEt{∆gˆit+1}. (33)
This equation fully characterizes the demand side of country i’s economy. Obviously,
this equilibrium condition has to hold for all member countries indexed by i ∈ (0, 1).
Consequently, one can derive the union-wide DIS equation by intergrating (33) over i:
yˆ?t = Et{yˆ?t+1} − (1− γ)(r?t − Et{pi?t+1} − ρ)− γEt{∆gˆ?t+1} (34)
3.4.2 Aggregate Supply - The New Keynesian Phillips Curve
The next task is to derive the second key equation that summarizes the dynamics on the
supply side of the economy. It can be shown that the profit maximizing price-setting
strategy (27) can be manipulated such that one finally gets an expression that determines
the inflation dynamics in the economy. This equation is often referred to as New Keynesian
Phillips Curve (or NKPC, for short) and is given by:
piit = βEt{piit+t}+ λm̂cit, (35)
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where λ ≡ (1 − βθ)(1 − θ)θ−1 is strictly increasing in the index of price stickiness. m̂cit
denotes the log deviation of marginal cost from its steady state value m¯c = −µ16. Solving
(35) under rational expectations yields:
pit = λ
∞∑
k=0
βkEt{m̂cit+k}.
Additionally, by defining the average mark-up in the economy as µt = mct, it is seen that
inflation will be high when firms expect average mark-ups, and hence marginal costs, to
be below their steady state level µ. In that case, firms that have the opportunity to reset
their prices will choose a price above the economy’s average price level in order to arrange
their mark-up closer to its steady state level.
Hence, inflation results from aggregate firms’ price-setting decisions, which in turn
are determined by current and expected real marginal costs. Accordingly, it makes sense
to analyze the cyclical behavior of marginal costs. For this purpose, I derive a relation
between economy’s real marginal costs and key variables measuring aggregate economic
activity.
Note first that one can write marginal costs in (22) as:
mcit = (w
i
t − pic,t) + (pic,t − pit)− ait + log(1− τ i).
This can be combined with (17) to get:
mcit = (w
i
t − pic,t) + αsit − ait + log(1− τ i). (36)
From (36) it can be seen that an increase in productivity must lead either to an increase
in real wages or terms of trade, or a decrease in (real) marginal costs. As it will be evident
later, depending on how policy is conducted, the outcome is either reflected in output or
inflation.
Combining this expression of marginal costs with the partial adjustment real wage
equation in (20) one gets :
mcit = κ
imcit−1 + (1− κiL)(αsit − ait + log(1− τ i)) (37)
+(1− κi)(cit + φnit − log(1− χ))
= αsit − ait + log(1− τ i) +
1− κi
1− κiL(c
i
t + φn
i
t − log(1− χ)). (38)
16It is evident from basic micro theory (e.g. Wolfstetter, 2002) that the desired mark-up under flexible
prices and wages is mct = m¯c = µ for all t = 0, 1, 2, ...
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Expression (37) suggests that the higher the real wage rigidity, the higher the inertial
adjustment of real marginal costs. This is in line with empirical evidence. In a seminal
paper Gal´ı, Gertler and Lopez- Salido (2001, 2003) found empirically that real wage rigidity
is indeed a significant factor in accounting for sluggish cyclical movement in marginal costs.
In order to express the latter equations in terms of deviations from the steady state I
make use of (26), (30) and the fact that s¯i = 0 and a¯i = 1.
m̂cit = κ
im̂cit−1 + (1− κiL)(αsit − ait) (39)
+(1− κi)
(
(φ+
1
1− γ )yˆ
i
t −
γ
1− γ gˆ
i
t − αsit − φait
)
= αsit − ait +
1− κi
1− κiL
(
(φ+
1
1− γ )yˆ
i
t −
γ
1− γ gˆ
i
t − αsit − φait
)
(40)
It is seen that marginal costs depend positively (negatively) on current (lagged) terms of
trade (proportionally depending on α). This can be explained by rigid real wages from
the households’ perspective, i.e. assessed in terms of current and lagged CPI (which in
turn depends on the terms of trade as shown above). Interestingly, there is a negative
relationship between public spending and marginal costs (depending on the index of real
wage rigidity). The rationale for this is simple: given the output, an increase in government
spending crowds out domestic consumption and/or generates a real appreciation, both of
which tend to reduce real marginal costs through their negative effect on the product
wage. In addition, the negative effect of government spending on marginal costs increases
in γ. To make this clear, consider the following situation: Given an increase in output
while government spending and technology remain unchanged, a larger γ would increase
consumption and/or terms of trade; both would lead to a higher product price and, thus,
marginal costs would decline.
Since marginal costs feed into the determination of prices through the NKPC, I estab-
lish a direct channel of real wage rigidities to translate into aggregate inflation of country
i. This is done by combining (35) and (40). Multiplying the resulting expression by 1−κ
iL
1−κi
and rearranging terms finally yields:
piit = κ
ipiit−1 + βEt{piit+1} − κiβEt−1{pit}+ λκiα∆sit − λ(1 + (1− κi)φ)ait
+λκiait−1 + λ(1− κi)(φ+
1
1− γ )yˆ
i
t −
λ(1− κi)γ
1− γ gˆ
i
t. (41)
Integrating this expression over all member states, yields the NKPC for the union as a
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whole, namely
pi?t = κ
?pi?t−1 + βEt{pi?t+1} − κ?βEt−1{pit} − λ(1 + (1− κ?)φ)a?t
+λκ?a?t−1 + λ(1− κ?)(φ+
1
1− γ )yˆ
?
t −
λ(1− κ?)γ
1− γ gˆ
?
t . (42)
where κ? ≡ ∫ 10 κidi and a?t ≡ ∫ 10 aitdi for all i ∈ (0, 1).
So far, I have derived a log-linear equilibrium according to the definition above. Given a
function for government spending and a nominal interest rate characterizing the monetary
policy, that equilibrium can be summarized for each individual economy by (33) and (41),
or for the union as a whole by (34) and (42).
4 Calibration and Implementation
In the following numerical analysis of the model, I assume that time is taken as quarters.
I set the discount factor β = 0.99, so that the riskless annual return is about 4 percent.
Following Gal´ı and Monacelli (2008) I set the value added steady state mark-up of prices
over marginal costs to 1.2. This generates a value for the price elasticity of demand, ,
of 6. Moreover, I assume a labor supply elasticity of 1/3, which implies that φ = 3.
That roughly goes in line with empirical findings for the Euro Area (e.g. Smets and
Wouters, 2003). The degree of domestic and union-wide real wage rigidity is set to a
benchmark value of 0.8. This value implies a half-live of deviations of the real wage from
its equilibrium level of about 3 quarters, what corresponds to recent empirical evidence
for the euro area in Arpaia and Pichelmann (2007). The Calvo parameter is set to 0.8,
which corresponds to an average nominal price duration of five quarters, which is in line
with the empirical findings for the euro area in Altissimo, Ehrmann and Smets (2006). For
the degree of home bias in private consumption, I follow Forlati (2007) and set α = 0.4.
The weight of the public bundle in the preferences is set to χ = γ = 0.25, which roughly
corresponds to the average share of government consumption in GDP for the EMU. Finally,
by following standard RBC literature (e.g. Backus et al., 1992), I calibrate the domestic
productivity shock as a first order autoregressive process with standard deviations to 0.008
and persistence to 0.95. I assume the union-wide (symmetric) shock to technology to have
the same stochastic properties. If not indicated differently, I further assume this baseline
calibration in the following quantitative analysis.
In order to solve the system of linear rational-expectations equations with lagged ex-
pectations, I follow the numerical procedure proposed by Meyer-Gohde (2007)but with
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some computational extensions. Basically, this approach is based on the method of un-
determined coefficients for the infinite MA representation. A detailed discussion of the
implementation procedure as well as the underlying source codes is let to a technical
appendix which is available upon request.
5 Results
5.1 Policy Trade-offs
5.1.1 Member Country’s Trade-off
In a foregoing section, I have derived a dynamic equilibrium in terms of real (aggregate)
variables. In order to better interpret the business cycle behavior of the economy from a
welfare point of view, I further use the conventional notation of gap variables. That is,
from now on I consider the deviations of the actual economy’s variables from the welfare
optimal level (i.e. the outcome in a pareto efficient allocation). That is, the smaller the
gaps are, the smaller the welfare losses.
To rewrite the equilibrium equations derived above, in terms of gap variables, notice
first that marginal costs in an economy with no distortions and flexible prices and wages
are given by:
mcit = c¯
i
t + φn¯
i
t + αs¯
i
t − ait − log(1− χ).
for all i ∈ (0, 1) and t = 0, 1, 2, ...
Perfect competition implies that there is no price mark-up set by the firms and real
marginal costs are constant, given by mcit = −µ. Thus, one has: m̂c
i
t = mc
i
t + µ = 0.
Using the same results as for computing (40), one can write the deviations of marginal
costs from their steady state value as:
m̂c
i
t =
(
1
1− γ + φ
)
ˆ¯yit −
γ
1− γ ˆ¯g
i
t − (1 + φ)ait = 0 (43)
for all i ∈ (0, 1) and t = 0, 1, 2, ...
Next, I define y˜it ≡ yit − y¯it and g˜it ≡ git − g¯it as output gap and government spending
gap. Moreover, I define a measure for the fiscal stance: f˜ it ≡ g˜it − y˜it = (git − yit) − logχ
which I henceforth refer to as the fiscal gap. Using these definitions and imposing an
optimal steady state government spending share (γ = χ), one can substract (43) from
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(41) to rewrite the NKPC for country i in terms of gap variables
piit = κ
ipiit−1 + βEt{piit+1} − κiβEt−1{piit}
+λκiα∆sit − λκi∆ait + λ(1 + φ)y˜it −
λχ
1− χf˜
i
t . (44)
Since domestic policy depends on union-wide decision making, one can combine (31),
(32) and the fact that inflation differentials are inversely proportional to productivity
growth differentials17, to obtain an equation that determines the output gap differentials
in terms of fiscal gap differentials and changes in inflation differentials:
∆y˜it −∆y˜?t =
χ
1− χ(∆f˜
i
t −∆f˜?t )− [∆sit + (∆ait −∆a?t )]
=
χ
1− χ(∆f˜
i
t −∆f˜?t )− [(piit − pi?t ) + (∆ait −∆a?t )] (45)
The previous two expressions describe the dynamics of domestic price level, output gap,
and fiscal gap, given the aggregate variables determined by union-wide policy. They make
clear that the trade-off is twofold.
Consider first the situation where real wages are fully flexible, i.e. κi = 0. Then, equa-
tion (44) describing the behavior of the price level, implies that by closing the output and
fiscal gap at all times, the price level is fully stabilized. However, equation (45) states that,
given union-wide policy and in the presence of asymmetric productivity shocks, closing
gap variables requires adjustment in terms of trade and, hence, in domestic price level (or
vice versa). Since symmetric shifts to technology, however, imply inflation differentials to
be inversely proportional to the productivity growth differentials, no further adjustment
in terms of trade (or in the domestic price level) is required while output and fiscal gaps
are closed.
Things differ substantially if real wage rigidities are present. It is easily seen from
(44) that closing the output and fiscal gap at all times does no longer imply full price
level stability, even if shocks are purely symmetric. To understand the basic source of
this trade-off, consider again the economy’s factor price frontier in (36). Note that under
flexible wages a sudden shift in domestic productivity leads to an increase in real wages.
If real wages are sticky, a shock in domestic productivity also leads to a decline in real
marginal costs18. Obviously, the higher the real wage sluggishness, the higher the decrease
in real marginal costs. It is seen in a previous section that the NKPC provides a direct
17That is, piit − pi?t = −(∆ait −∆a?t ). The derivation of this result can be found in the appendix.
18This is because domestic authorities cannot avoid that the terms of trade adjust inefficiently.
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channel of real marginal costs translate into the aggregate domestic inflation. The dynamic
relationship implied by (35) makes clear that the more real marginal costs decrease, the
more the price level is under (downward) pressure. To grasp this point more precisely, it
can be seen from (44) that an increasing pressure on the price level (and, hence, on terms
of trade) can only be absorbed by an increasing output relative to its efficient outcome19.
To conclude, in the presence of real wage rigidities in country i, even given symmetric
shocks to technology, stabilizing the price level and gap variables simultaneously is not
possible.
Furthermore, equation (44) implies that, given κi > 0, a change in the output gap, even
if purely transitory, has a persistent impact on the domestic inflation. As aforementioned,
the rationale for this phenomena is considerably simple: Any change in the workers’
reservation wage resulting from a change in output (and thus a change in employment),
will affect the real wage (and hence real marginal costs) only gradually, with that effect
outliving the eventual return of output to its natural level. To illustrate this point, note
that one can write the NKPC in (44) as:
piit = x˜
i
1pi
i
t−1 + x˜
i
2Et{piit+1}+ x˜i3(piit − Et−1{piit}) + x˜i4∆sit − x˜i5∆ait + x˜i6y˜it − x˜i7f˜ it , (46)
where x˜i1 ≡ κ
i
1+κiβ
, x˜i2 ≡ β1+κiβ , x˜i3 ≡ κ
iβ
1+κiβ
, x˜i4 ≡ λκ
iα
1+κiβ
, x˜i5 ≡ λκ
i
1+κiβ
, x˜6 ≡ λ(1+φ)1+κiβ , and
x˜i7 ≡ λ1+κiβ γ1−γ . Obviously, the weight attached to lagged and expected inflation depends
on the degree of real wage rigidity: the higher κi, the higher the weight on lagged inflation
and the lower the one associated with expected inflation.
Notice that the latter expression is very similar to a hybrid version of the NKPC
recently discussed in the literature20.
19Without loss of generality, I here abstract from fiscal policy as a stabilization instrument set f˜ it = 0.
In the next section the role of fiscal policy is discussed in detail.
20The reason for a number of researchers to recently consider a hybrid version of the NKPC is the
striking empirical limitations of the standard one, which has a similar form to pit = βEt{pit+1} + λνy˜t
(where the variables and parameters are defined as above and ν is the output elasticity of real marginal
costs). As argued in Gal´ı and Gertler (1999), an essential problem is that the standard NKPC implies that
inflation should lead the output gap over the cycle, in the sense that a rise (decline) in current inflation
should signal a subsequent rise (decline) in the output gap. This is in stark contrast to empirical findings.
For more recent contributions on the empirical assessment of hybrid NKPC, see Sbordone (2005), Gal´ı,
Gertler and Lopez-Salido (2005), Linde´ (2005) and Rudd and Whelan (2005).
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5.1.2 Union-wide Trade-offs
In order to derive the implications for union-wide policies, I integrate (44) over i, which
yields the aggregate NKPC for the union as a whole
pi?t = κ
?pi?t−1 + βEt{pi?t+1} − κ?βEt−1{pi?t } − λκ?∆a?t + λ(1 + φ)y˜?t −
λχ
1− χf˜
?
t . (47)
Second, one can use (34) to derive an expression that determines the union-wide output
gap:
y˜?t = Et{y˜?t+1} − (1− χ)(r?t − Et{pi?t+1} − rr?t )− χEt∆g˜?t+1
=
χ
1− χf˜
?
t − (r?t − Et{pi?t+1} − rr?t ) + Et{y˜?t+1} −
χ
1− χEt{f˜
?
t+1}, (48)
where rr?t is the natural rate of interest, given by:
rr?t = ρ+
1
1− χ(Et{∆y¯
?
t+1 − χEt{g¯?t+1})
= ρ+ Et{∆y¯?t+1}
= ρ+ {Et∆a?t+1}.
The NKPC in (47) and the DIS equation in (48) now fully describe the dynamics of
aggregate inflation and output gap, given a monetary policy rule in the form of a nominal
interest rate and a fiscal policy determining the fiscal gap for all member states.
Since each member country is assumed to be of measure zero, a domestic shock to tech-
nology has no effect on union-wide dynamics. Thus, as long as a country-specific shock is
indiosyncratic, it does not affect aggregate technology, i.e. a? remains at a constant (zero)
level. As a consequence, closing union-wide gap variables is always feasible (and optimal)
and goes along with a constant aggergate inflation. This result is standard in basic NK
business cycle theory and is by Blanchard and Gal´ı (2007) referred to as “divine coinci-
dence”. In reality, central banks often perceive a trade-off between stabilizing the price
level and stabilizing the gap between actual output and desired output. However, note
that even in the presence of an union-wide shift to technology this “divine coincidence”
still holds but only conditional on fully felxible real wages. This result corresponds to the
findings of Gal´ı and Monacelli (2008).
Given a sluggish adjustments of real wages and an union-wide shock to technology,
the NKPC in (47) implies that there is not an exact relation anymore, however complex,
between aggregate inflation and the welfare-relevant union-wide output gap. However,
note that if either prices or wages are fully flexible the “divine coincidence” is valid again.
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This is a result already shown by Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000) and Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) for a single closed country’s economy with staggered nom-
inal wage setting21. This can be easily explained by considering the union as a single
closed economy: Note that zero variance in inflation implies that firms are always on their
optimal labor demand schedules at all time. Since more flexibility in the real wages implies
that the people’s labor supply schedule is closer to the firms’ optimal demand for labor,
one has less variations in inflation and gap variables. To see this formally, consider the
union-wide NKPC in (42). The smaller κ?, the smaller the trade-off. Alternatively, if
prices adjust more freely firms can be kept closer to their optimal labor demand sched-
ules. Technically spoken, a decrease in θ causes a decrease in λ. Again, the smaller λ, the
smaller the trade-off considered above.
Given the situation of real wage and price rigidity and an aggregate shift in productiv-
ity, it can be easily seen that whatever policy is conducted, aggregate welfare losses have
to be accepted. Thus, there is no way to stabilize both, inflation and gap variables, and
the common central bank faces a clear trade-off. I find below that the welfare optimal
policy allows variations in all three target variables.
5.2 Optimal Monetary and Fiscal Policy Design
The aim of this paper is to derive optimal monetary and fiscal policy rules for a currency
union. Optimality is measured in terms of welfare. Thus, the first step in deriving such
optimal policies should be to characterize the welfare to be maximized. In the previous
section, I defined welfare as the aggregate households’ utility. Since there are no (static)
distortions in the steady state (given the subsidy is set correctly), the policymakers’ (per-
fect coordinated fiscal and monetary authorities) joint objective is the same as in the
social planner’s problem. The only difference is that political authorities are subject to
the equilibrium conditions for any individual member country, as discussed above. In
the following I derive optimal policies for domestic and union-wide authorities under full
commitment and full coordination22
21Basically, the implication for the union as a whole are closely related to those of a closed economy
studied in Blanchard and Gal´ı (2007).
22The term “optimal” - at least seen from an union-wide perspective - already implies somewhat perfect
coordinated (and committed) policies. Moreover, if non-coordinated authorities are considered, the task
of deriving optimal policies becomes numerically more complex. In this regard, a closer examination of
Forlati (2008) is instructive.
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As the analysis is based on gap variables instead of real variables, a welfare objective
based on piit, y˜
i
t, and f˜
i
t for all i ∈ (0, 1) and t = 0, 1, 2, ... has to be derived. A closer look
at the derivation of a purely quadratic loss function, which represents the approximated
(up to second order) welfare losses due to variations from the efficient (steady state) level
of inflation, output gap, and fiscal gap is let to the appendix. It can be shown that the
objective of the coordinated monetary and fiscal authorities is to minimize the welfare
losses, which can be expressed in terms of inflation and gap variables as:
WL =
1
2
∞∑
t=0
βt
∫ 1
0
(

λ
(piit)
2 + (1 + φ)(y˜it)
2 +
χ
1− χ(f˜
i
t )
2
)
di+ t.i.p+ ‖O(ζt)‖3 , (49)
where t.i.p denotes terms independent from policy and ‖O(ζt)‖3 are terms of higher order.
There are several important qualitative features which are evidently seen from (49).
The welfare cost of variation in the price level is increasing with the substitutability across
varieties produced within any country and the average duration of prices. Note that a
rise in the price level in, say country i, follows a decline in the effective terms of trade.
Therefore, the higher , the higher the cost of inflation. Again, welfare is independent
of variation in the price level, only in the special case of complectly flexible prices. This
result can naturally be comprehended by regarding the dynamics of inflation determined
by the NKPC in (35).
Moreover, it can be perceived that the cost of output deviation from its welfare optimal
level is decreasing with labor supply elasticity, i.e 1/φ. Notice that an increase in output
gap implies an increase in employment relative to its welfare optimal level. Thus, the
higher the labor supply elasticity, the less costly a variation in employment and, hence, in
output. Finally, it should be intuitively clear that the cost of variation in the fiscal stance
depends positively on the weight attached to public consumption.
5.2.1 The Policy Makers’ Problem
As abovementioned, the policy makers’ task is to minimize the welfare losses for all mem-
ber states i ∈ (0, 1) and all periods of time t = 0, 1, 2, ..., subject to the single country
equilibrium conditions (44) and (45), as well as the “aggregation” constraints:
pi?t =
∫ 1
0
piitdi, y˜
?
t =
∫ 1
0
y˜itdi, f˜
?
t =
∫ 1
0
f˜ itdi. (50)
To approximate welfare losses due to variations in the policy makers’ target variables,
a purely quadratic loss function is considered. That is, the policy makers’ objective has a
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clear functional form given by:
L =
1
2
∞∑
t=0
βt
∫ 1
0
(

λ
(piit)
2 + (1 + φ)(y˜it)
2 +
χ
1− χ(f˜
i
t )
2
)
di. (51)
Now, one can state the common policy problem in the following Lagrangian:
L =
∞∑
t=0
∫ 1
0
{
1
2
βt
(

λ
(piit)
2 + (1 + φ)(y˜it)
2 +
χ
1− χ(f˜
i
t )
2
)
(52)
+ψipi,t
(
piit − κipiit−1 − βEt{piit+1}+ βκiEt−1{piit} − λκiα∆sit
+λκi∆ait − λ(1 + φ)y˜it +
λχ
1− χf˜
i
t
)
+ψiy,t
(
∆y˜it −∆y˜?t −
χ
1− χ(∆f˜
i
t −∆f˜?t ) + piit − pi?t + ∆ait −∆a?t
)
+ψ?pi,t
(
pi?t −
∫ 1
0
piitdi
)
+ψ?y,t
(
y˜?t −
∫ 1
0
y˜itdi
)
+ψ?f,t
(
f˜?t −
∫ 1
0
f˜ itdi
)}
di,
where ψipi,t, ψ
i
y,t, ψ
?
pi,t, ψ
?
y,t, and ψ
?
f,t denote the discounted Lagrange multipliers associated
with the constraints in (44), (45), and (50).
Minimizing (52) with respect to {piit, y˜it, f˜ it} for all i ∈ (0, 1) and all t = 0, 1, 2, ... leads
to the following optimality conditions:
∂L
∂piit
:

λ
piit +
(
(1 + κiβ)− κiβL−1 − L
)
ψipi,t + ψ
i
y,t − ψ?pi,t = 0 (53)
∂L
∂y˜it
: (1 + φ)y˜it − λ(1 + φ)ψipi,t + (1− βL−1)ψiy,t − ψ?y,t = 0 (54)
∂L
∂f˜ it
:
χ
1− χf˜
i
t +
λχ
1− χψ
i
pi,t −
χ(1− βL−1)
1− χ ψ
i
y,t − ψ?f,t = 0 (55)
∂L
∂pi?t
: −
∫ 1
0
ψiy,tdi+ ψ
?
pi,t = 0 (56)
∂L
∂y˜?t
: −(1− βL−1)
∫ 1
0
ψiy,tdi+ ψ
?
y,t = 0 (57)
∂L
∂f˜?t
:
χ(1− βL−1)
1− χ
∫ 1
0
ψiy,tdi+ ψ
?
f,t = 0, (58)
5.2.2 Union-wide Equilibrium Dynamics under the Optimal Policy
In order to derive the implied path for pi?t , y˜
?
t , and f˜
?
t , one can integrate (53) over i and
by combining the resulting expression with (56) one gets:

λ
pi?t +
(
(1 + κ?β)− κ?βL−1 − L
)∫ 1
0
ψipi,tdi = 0. (59)
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Similarly, integrating (54) over i and combining with (57) yields:
(1 + φ)y˜?t − λ(1 + φ)
∫ 1
0
ψipi,tdi = 0. (60)
Now, by combining the latter two equations, one can derive a monetary policy rule that
specifies a condition to be fulfilled by the central bank’s target variables:
pi?t = −
1 + κ?β

y˜?t +
κ?β

Et{y˜?t+1}+
1

y˜?t−1 (61)
for all t = 0, 1, 2, ... The previous equation has a simple interpretation: In the face of
disinflationary pressure due to a shift in (aggregate) technology, the central bank must
respond by driving the union-wide output above its efficient level, thus creating a positive
output gap, to damp the downward pressure on the union’s price level. Of course, the
pressure on the price level increases with κ? and so does the output gap created by the
central bank. By combining (58) with (60), one gets the following equation, describing
the dynamic behavior of aggregate gap variables:
f˜?t = −y˜?t , (62)
for all t = 0, 1, 2, ... It is evidently seen, that the aggregate fiscal stance remains at its
efficient level at all time. Since fiscal policy is not a valid instrument to stabilize the
union-wide economy, the common central bank takes over this role. Technically, one could
combine (47),(61), and (62) to describe the target variables’ dynamics under the optimal
policy.
The equilibrium behavior of the union-wide economy under the optimal policy as a
response to a sudden shift in aggregate technology are illustrated in figures 1-2. As afore-
mentioned, there is no way to stabilize inflation, output gap and fiscal gap simultaneously.
This result is contrary to a lot of existing literature on optimal monetary (and fiscal) pol-
icy. Moreover, its policy implication, namely accept variations in the price level and give
some weight to output stabilization, contradicts the actual policy of the ECB, which rather
pursues a policy of price stability (also in the presence of EMU-wide shocks). However, it
is important to sharply distinguish between aggregate and country-specific indiosyncratic
shocks to technology. While the first one results in an active role of monetary policy, the
latter one still yields to strict inflation targeting as an optimal monetary policy rule.
The optimal targeting rule for monetary policy derived above, implicitly assumes that
the central bank can choose its desired level of inflation, output gap, and fiscal gap. Of
course, in practice the policy maker cannot set all three target variables simultaneously.
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One possibility to achieve the desired outcome anyway, is to set its political instrument,
namely the nominal interest rate such that the opitmal allocation is achieved. If real wages
are fully flexible, the central bank faces no trade-off between stabilizing inflation or output
around potential. Regarding the DIS in terms of gap variables in(48) indicates that the
interest rate that supports the efficient allocation is always equal to the natural rate of
interest, and which is invariant to monetary policy.
However, if real wages are rigid monetary policy monetary plays a central role for
stabilizing the aggregate economy. By combining (48), (61) and (62) it can be seen that
in the welfare optimal equilibrium the nominal interest rate then equals:
r?t = φ
1
yy˜
?
t−1 + φ
2
yEt{y˜?t+1}+ φ1pipi?t + φ2piEt{pit+1}+ rr?t ,
for all t = 0, 1, 2, ... and where φ1y ≡ − χ1+κ?β , φ2y ≡ χ− χκ
?β
1+κ?β , φ
1
pi ≡ χ1+κ?β , and φ2pi ≡ 1.
5.2.3 Domestic Equilibrium Dynamics under the Optimal Policy
First, I will investigate the paths of inflation, output gap and fiscal gap in a member state
implied by the optimal policy derived above. For this purpose, note first that (57) together
with (58) can be written as:
ψ?f,t = −
χ
1− χψ
?
y,t
Now, combining (54) with (55) and using the latter expression yields:
λφψipi,t = (1 + φ)y˜
i
t + f˜
i
t (63)
Reconsider that the NKPC for each member state is derived from its basic version in (35).
This makes clear that (44) is a binding constraint for the optimization task in (52) as long
as λ > 0 and, hence, as long as θ > 0 holds. Thus, as long as prices are less than fully
flexible, ψipi,t is a positive number strict greater than zero. From this it follows that under
the union-wide optimal policy neither y˜it nor f˜
i
t remain at its efficient level (also when real
wages are fully flexible). Second, I derive a dynamic equilibrium of the domestic economy
in country i. First, one can combine (53) with (56) to get:
piit = −
λ

ψipi,t +
λκiβ
(1 + κiβ)
Et{ψipi,t+1}+
λ
(1 + κiβ)
ψipi,t−1 −
λ
(1 + κiβ)
Ψiy˜,t, (64)
where Ψiy˜,t ≡ ψiy˜,t−
∫ 1
0 ψ
i
y˜,tdi. Note that the aggregate multiplier must evolve exogenously
from country i’s perspective and, hence, the equilibrium relationship holds for any value
of
∫ 1
0 ψ
i
y˜,tdi. Similarly, combining (54) with (57) yields:
y˜it = λψ
i
pi,t −
1
1 + φ
Ψiy˜,t +
β
1 + φ
Et{Ψiy˜,t+1}. (65)
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Finally, (55) together with (58) can be written as:
f˜ it = −λψipi,t + Ψiy˜,t − βEt{Ψiy˜,t+1}. (66)
Now, I can define a rational expectations equilibrium under union-wide optimal policies
for country i as an allocation of {piit, y˜it, f˜ it , ψipi,t,Ψiy˜,t} for all t = 0, 1, 2, ... that satisfies (44),
(45), (64), (65), and (66).
Note that this description of a rational expectations equilibrium is only valid if, and
only if, θ > 0. If prices in country i are fully flexible, (63) can be written as:
1
1 + φ
f˜ it = −y˜it
and combined with (44) and (45) describes the equilibrium dynamics of the domestic
economy given flexible prices.
Again, one has to distinguish between asymmetric and symmetric growth in productiv-
ity. The equilibrium dynamics for country i in the first scenario are illustrated in figures
3-4. Comparing the results with the optimal policies for the union-wide level, one can
asses that the roles of monetary and fiscal policy are reversed (also if real wages are fully
flexible). While fiscal policy is not used to stabilize the aggregate economy, monetary
policy will not be employed to stabilize the local economies, because it cannot affect cross-
country inflation differentials. Instead, domestic fiscal policy takes this role. The domestic
fiscal authority employs the public spending in order to damp domestic deflation. Due to a
shock in technology, the domestic price level is under upward pressure, since neither prices
nor wages can adjust directly. The domestic fiscal authority employs its fiscal instrument
to damp the pressure on the price level. How fiscal policy is conducted depends on the
degree of rigidity in prices and real wages. If only prices are less than fully flexible, the rise
in productivity must be absorbed via a gradual fall of the price level, with the consequent
relative price distortions. Hence, to the extent that the price level reacts gradually, the
rise in productivity will be absorbed by a combination of a fall in the output gap and a
rise in the fiscal gap. Expanding the fiscal gap is necessary to bring about the demand
to accommodate the desired expansion in output. In general, the local fiscal authority
necessarily faces a trade-off between accepting movements in inflation on the one hand,
and movements in the output and fiscal gap on the other. The higher the degree of price
rigidity, the larger the implied fluctuations of both gaps under the optimal policy. As
aforementioned, if additionally real wages react inertially, the downward pressure on the
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price level increases. The increasing pressure has to be absorbed by an increase in ac-
tual output relative to its efficient level. Again, public spending has to bring about the
necessary rise in demand.
Figure 5 illustrates national and union-wide dynamics if technology growth affects all
member countries simultaneously. Now, domestic fiscal policies are not needed to adjust
cross-country inflation differentials but only absorb the pressure on the price level due to
real wage rigidities. This is a crucial insight of this model and an important implication
for optimal policiy design in the EMU.
5.3 Welfare Implications of Alternative Monetary Policy Rules
While the optimal fiscal policy derived above coresponds -more or less- to the policy
conducted by EMU member states, the implication for optimal union-wide monetary policy
-in case of symmetric shocks- differs from the actual behavior of the ECB, which policy is
rather driven by a (strict) price level target. As abovementioned, if either prices or real
wages are flexible, this strategy indeed achieves the pareto optimal allocation. In contrast,
I have shown that if both, prices and real wages, adjust sluggishly the pareto optimum is
not feasible anymore and the optimal monetary and fiscal policy rules are associated with
non-zero variances in all three target variables. According to my analytical results -given
the existence of real wage and price rigidities as well as union-wide growth in productivity-
the policy conducted by the ECB, however, might not minimize aggregate welfare losses.
Thus, it is of interest to compare other simple targeting rules with the optimal one in (61)
concerning the union-wide welfare losses accompanied with sticky prices and rigid real
wages. While I examine the consequences for different monetary policy rules, I assume
that domestic policies are set optimally according the analytcal resulsts derived above.
Following Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000), I measure the welfare losses relative to
the pareto optimum as a fraction of steady state consumption. That is, the period loss
function in (51) is scaled by UC(C¯, G¯, N¯)C¯. I calculate welfare costs for varying κ?, and
θ the other parameters of the model are set according to the benchmark calibration. The
results are presented in tables 1-2.
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Table 1: Welfare Costs of Alternative Monetary Policy Rules for varying κ?.
κ? Optimal Policy Rule Strict Inflation Target Strict Output Gap Target
0 0 0 0
0.1 7.005× 10−4 1.543× 10−3 2.843× 10−1
0.4 1.289× 10−2 2.469× 10−2 9.62
0.75 5.590× 10−2 8.679× 10−2 160.73
0.99 1.136× 10−1 1.512× 10−1 26253.7
Table 2: Welfare Costs of Alternative Monetary Policy Rules for varying θ
θ Optimal Policy Rule Strict Inflation Target Strict Output Gap Target
0 0 0 0
0.1 9.805× 10−2 9.874× 10−2 2374.3
0.4 9.344× 10−2 9.874× 10−2 265.27
0.75 7.249× 10−2 9.874× 10−2 25.132
0.99 5.508× 10−3 9.874× 10−2 5.885× 10−1
Interestingly, higher nominal inertia is found to be welfare-enhancing in the presence of
real wage rigidities. A rationale for this phenomena is quite intuitive: Considering aggre-
gate variables, a higher degree of nominal price rigidity damps the initial consumer goods
price response and mitigates the second-round effects from nominal wages on production
costs.
However, the main implication of this quantitative experiment is that strict output
targeting performs worst in all simulations and that strict inflation targeting is nearly
as effective in minimizing welfare losses as the optimal policy. This is not surprising. As
discussed above, real wage rigidity causes inertia in marginal costs, and hence, in inflation.
To illustrate this point, note that if the central bank conducts strict output targeting with
full credibility the NKPC in (47) turns out to be:
pi?t = κ
?pi?t−1 + βEt{pi?t+1} − κ?βEt−1{pi?t } − λκ?∆a?t
Given an exogenous variation in technology, the inflation will react persistently. These
dynamics are illustrated in figures 6-7.
Similarly, one can analyze the welfare impact of a credible inflation target by writing
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the NKPC as:
κ?∆a?t + (1 + φ)y˜
?
t −
χ
1− χf˜
?
t = 0.
It can now easily be seen that the gap variables will not outlive any variation in technology
for a long time. Furthermore, it should be clear that the index of price stickiness does not
influence the welfare costs anymore - if prices are constant, θ is redundant. The behavior
of the gap variables are illustrated in figures 8-9.
At this point one should mention that the optimal targeting rule for monetary policy
in (61) has one major drawback: Its properties and parameters depend on the whole
model of the economy, including shocks and their stochastic properties, as well as the
assumption of an optimal fiscal policy. Hence, it might be a better policy advice for the
common central bank to fall back on the “second best” policy rule, namely strict inflation
targeting, since the welfare costs might be lower than the ones from a misestimation of
the model’s parameters or a misspecification of the model itself. It requires no knowledge
of the model’s parameters but is close to the optimal monetary policy for any variation in
the degree of real wage persistence (and the index of price stickiness).
6 Conclusion
In this paper I investigate the consequences of real wage rigidities for optimal fiscal and
monetary policy in a framework of a multicountry NK model of a currency union, where
monetary policy is implemented union-wide by a single central bank, and the fiscal policy
is let alone to domestic authorities. I use shocks to productivity growth in order to
analyze the equilibrium-dynamics of the domestic and union-wide economy. I assume that
a domestic policy decision has very little impact on other member countries, and hence
on the (aggregate) union-wide economy. As a consequence, one has to sharply distinguish
between country-specific, idiosyncratic and symmetric shifts to productivity. Considering
the first scenario, I find that only the domestic country’s authorities are facing a trade-
off between stabilzing output around potential and inflation. In the latter setting also
the common monetary authority faces a trade-off between stabilizing the aggregate price
level and the welfare relevant output. Since marginal costs feed into the determination of
prices through the NKPC, I establish a direct channel of real wage rigidities to translate
into aggregate inflation dynamics. I find that rigid real wages indeed provide evidence for
inflation inertia.
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I derive optimal monetary and fiscal policy from a union-wide perspective in the form
of targeting rules. This is done by maximizing the aggregate welfare of the union. Thereby
I assume full commitment of the monetary and fiscal authorities. To approximate a welfare
objective, a pure quadratic loss function is used, which approximates the welfare losses
associated with variations in the target variables. While the fiscal policy cannot be used
to stabilize the aggregate economy, the common monetary policy does. Optimal monetary
policy suggests that, if nominal and real rigidities are present and the productivity growth
is common to all member countries, the central bank stabilizes union-wide economy via
a slightly countercyclical policy, to damp the downward pressure on the (aggregate) price
level. The countercyclical activity increases with the importance of nominal and real
rigidities. The role of fiscal and monetary policy is reversed on the national level. Since
domestic authorities cannot avoid that the terms of trade respond inefficiently (because of
the impossibility of resorting to nominal exchange rate adjustment), national fiscal policy
is justified as a stabilization tool also from a union-wide perspective. However, if shocks
are symmetric, not inflation differentials provide a rationale for a countercyclical policy
but only the sluggish adjustment of real wages. Again, the pressure on the price level has
to be absorbed -to a certain amount- by an expansion in output. To create this output
gap, the national government has to bring about the necessary demand. Generally, fiscal
policy on domestic level is expansionary also seen from the union’s perspective even if the
shocks are purely symmetric. Thus external constraints, like the SGP, may be questioned.
By comparing different union-wide monetary policy rules in terms of aggregate welfare
losses, I find that strict inflation targeting (conditional on the optimal implementation of
fiscal policy from the union’s prspective) is close to the optimal monetary policy. Since the
optimal rule is somehow complex, strict inflation targeting seems to be a “second best”
advice for monetary policy. However, this paper gives first evidence, that basically the
ECB should consider the presence of a possible trade-off between stabilizing price level
and output gap.
Of course, the present model used for policy analysis is an abstraction of the real world.
Many essential features are not included yet, since there is always a trade-off between
tractability and realism. Some aspects seem likely to be relevant for the design of policy.
I abstract from the need to rely on distortionary taxes, the effects of government debt
policies, and the likely existence of non-fully Ricardian behavior on the part of households.
Moreover, by relaxing the assumption of perfect risk-sharing, one could possibly generate
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a complementary role for fiscal policy as a cross-country insurance tool. Further research
is necessary to include more features related to reality.
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7 Figures
Figure 1: Impulse responses of union-wide variables under the optimal policy mix to an sym-
metric shock to technology, given the benchmark calibration and variations in κ?.
Figure 2: Impulse responses of union-wide variables under the optimal policy mix to an sym-
metric shock to technology, given the benchmark calibration and variations in θ.
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Figure 3: Impulse responses of domestic variables under the optimal policy mix to an idiosyn-
cratic shock to technology, given the benchmark calibration and variations in κi.
Figure 4: Impulse responses of domestic variables under the optimal policy mix to an idiosyn-
cratic shock to technology, given the benchmark calibration and variations in θ.
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Figure 5: Impulse responses of domestic and union-wide variables under the optimal policy mix
to an symmetric shock to technology, given the benchmark calibration and variations in κi.
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Figure 6: Impulse responses of union-wide variables under a strict output target to an symmetric
shock to technology, given the benchmark calibration and variations in κ?.
Figure 7: Impulse responses of union-wide variables under a strict output target to an symmetric
shock to technology, given the benchmark calibration and variations in θ.
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Figure 8: Impulse responses of union-wide variables under a strict inflation target to an sym-
metric shock to technology, given the benchmark calibration and variations in κ?.
Figure 9: Impulse responses of union-wide variables under a strict inflation target to an sym-
metric shock to technology, given the benchmark calibration and variations in θ.
41
Figure 10: The union-wide welfare loss function under the benchmark calibration.
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